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1. Introduction 
Tipping is a social norm that has gained increased attention in recent years, and for good 
reasons. One important reason is the economic significance of tipping. In the U.S., tips in the 
food industry are estimated to be around $42 billion annually, and obviously adding tips in 
additional industries and countries will result in a much higher figure.1 In addition, millions of 
workers in the U.S. derive most of their income from tips (Wessels 1997), tipping is prevalent in 
numerous countries and occupations (Star 1988), and tipping is related to various areas in 
economics (Azar 2003). Another reason for the interest in tipping is that tipping is intriguing 
from an economic perspective. The traditional assumption in economics that people are self-
interested and maximize their utility suggests that they should not leave money to others 
voluntarily, as people do when they tip (especially in the case of non-repeating customers who 
do not intend to visit the same establishment again). The prevalence of tipping even among non-
repeating customers implies that psychological and social motivations have an important role in 
explaining certain economic behaviors (additional examples for this are gift giving and 
donations). 
                                                 
1 The extent of tipping has to be estimated because tips are often unreported for tax purposes (according to 
Hemenway (1993), the only income with a lower compliance rate is illegal income). Sales in the U.S. in 2005 of 
food and alcoholic beverages to consumers in full-service restaurants, snack and nonalcoholic beverage bars, bars 
and taverns, and lodging places, were $164.8, $16.9, $15.3, and $25.2 billion, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 
2006, Table 1269; the numbers are a projection). Summing the four numbers gives sales of $222.2 billion. A recent 
study of tipping in various restaurants (Parrett 2003, Table 14) found that the average tip percentage (a simple 
average) was 23.22%. However, average tip amount was $6.52 and average bill size was $34.67, indicating that the 
weighted average (weighted by the bill size) was a tip of 18.8%. Being conservative, we multiply the latter 
percentage by $222.2 billion to get estimated annual tips of $41.8 billion.  
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Much of the literature on tipping is empirical and experimental, and reviewing it is beyond 
the scope of this article; the interested reader can refer to the literature reviews offered in Lynn 
and McCall (2000a), Lynn (2006), and Azar (2007a, 2007b). Papers devoted to theoretical 
models of tipping, however, are much fewer. The first economic model of tipping was 
introduced by Ben-Zion and Karni (1977). In their model, a customer chooses the tip and the 
demanded effort level, while the service provider chooses how many hours to work and what 
level of effort to supply. The equilibrium is defined as the point in which the demand and supply 
of effort are equal. The model suggests that the service provider supplies more than the minimal 
effort level only if the marginal reward for effort is positive. It also shows that tipping by non-
repeating customers is inconsistent with rational self-interested behavior.  
Jacob and Page (1980) examine buyer monitoring in general, and conclude that for certain 
parameter values, firms should use both buyers and owners to supervise employees. Schwartz 
(1997) claims that the low correlation between tips and service quality refutes the argument that 
tipping is an efficient quality-control mechanism. He suggests that tipping exists because it 
increases the firm's profits. Using a theoretical model, he shows that tipping can increase the 
firm’s profits when consumer segments differ in their demand functions and their propensity to 
tip. Ruffle (1999) presents a psychological game-theoretic model of gift giving where players' 
utility is affected by their beliefs and emotions such as surprise, disappointment, embarrassment, 
and pride. He then discusses how his model can be applied to tipping, suggesting that a customer 
who intends to tip generously but who looks like someone that tips poorly, should tip before the 
service is provided rather than afterwards. 
Azar (2004a) examines how firms should respond to tipping (or to other incentives that are 
not provided by the firm) when choosing monitoring intensity of workers. Increase in the 
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sensitivity of tips to service quality reduces optimal monitoring intensity but nevertheless 
increases effort and profits unambiguously. The model helps to explain why U.S. firms 
supported tipping in the late 19th century but raises the possibility that European firms make a 
mistake when they replace tips with fixed service charges. Azar (2004b) presents a model of 
social norms evolution and shows that when a norm is costly to follow and people do not derive 
benefits from following it except for avoiding social disapproval, the norm erodes over time. Tip 
percentages in the U.S., however, increased over the 20th century, suggesting that people derive 
benefits from tipping, such as impressing others and improving their self-image as being 
generous and kind. Azar (2005a) incorporates social norms and feelings of fairness and 
generosity in the customer's utility function. He finds that while in general tipping improves 
service quality and social welfare, the equilibrium is crucially affected by the sensitivity of tips 
to service quality. When this sensitivity is high, tipping can serve as a good monitoring 
mechanism and support an equilibrium with a high service quality. The lower this sensitivity is, 
the lower and farther away from the social optimum is equilibrium service quality.  
In this paper we present a dynamic model of tipping that addresses the role of tipping as a 
strategic investment in reputation and consequently in future service quality. In many cases (see 
for example Parrett 2006, for evidence from the restaurant industry), customers of services in 
which tips are common are repeating customers, who frequent the service establishment on a 
regular basis. This creates a completely different situation with different incentives for the 
customer and the service provider compared to a one-shot game between a non-repeating 
customer and a service provider. It is therefore important to analyze the case of repeating 
customers in a dynamic model that takes into account the repeated interactions, and yet the 
previous theoretical articles on tipping focus on static models that do not address the dynamics 
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and the evolution of such repeated interactions. Consequently, the model we present adds a new 
dimension to the theoretical literature on tipping.  
We assume that the service provider gives better service in future encounters to customers 
who were generous in the past. This assumption is consistent with empirical findings showing 
that waiters give better service when they expect larger tips (Barkan and Israeli 2004).2 As a 
result, the customer has an incentive to tip generously in order to improve service quality in the 
future. Moreover, in line with empirical research on tipping and previous theoretical models, 
tipping in our model also provides psychological utility. On the other hand, tipping has a 
monetary cost. Using an optimal-control theoretical framework where tip is the control variable 
and reputation is the state variable, we examine the optimal path of tipping.  
We find that tipping and reputation can evolve over time in four types of paths: (A) 
Converging to an interior stationary equilibrium with tips above the minimal level and positive 
reputation; (B) Tipping decreases first and then increases indefinitely, while reputation increases 
indefinitely from the beginning; (C) Tipping converges to the minimal tip and reputation 
converges to zero; and (D) Tipping and reputation increase indefinitely from the beginning. We 
then examine how the interior stationary equilibrium changes when the parameters of the model 
change. It turns out that when the reputation erodes more quickly (which corresponds to the case 
of customers who purchase the service less frequently), reputation in equilibrium is lower. 
Interestingly, however, tips are not necessarily lower – depending on the specific parameters and 
the utility function, tips might even be higher than those of more frequent customers. We also 
find that when the minimal tip increases, equilibrium tips are raised by the exact same increase, 
                                                 
2 A more detailed discussion of the justification for this assumption appears in the next section.  
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and equilibrium reputation does not change. Finally, a more patient customer leaves higher tips 
and reaches higher reputation in equilibrium.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
analyzes the customer's problem and finds the various optimal paths of tipping, illustrating how 
tipping and reputation might evolve over time. Section 4 examines how the parameters of the 
model affect the interior stationary equilibrium. Section 5 discusses related findings in the 
empirical literature on tipping behavior, and the last section concludes.  
2. The Model 
Consider a customer who is interested in receiving a given service (e.g., a dinner, a haircut, a 
car wash) repeatedly over a certain period of time (from time 0 to time T, where we assume that 
T → ∞ ). The customer's utility from the service is denoted by the function ( )Sφ , where S is 
service quality. We assume that ( ) 0φ′ • > and ( ) 0φ′′ • < . That is, the customer enjoys more when 
he receives better service, but the marginal utility from service quality is diminishing. In return 
for the service, the customer pays a price, and he may add a voluntary tip for the service 
provider. In different industries and different countries tipping practices differ significantly (Star 
1988). In some occupations tipping exists but many people choose not to tip (e.g., tipping hotel 
chambermaids in the U.S.), while in other situations (such as U.S. restaurants) virtually everyone 
tips (Azar 2006). Consequently, in some industries the minimum tip that people leave is zero, 
while in others there is some positive minimum threshold of tips such that virtually everyone tips 
at least this threshold.  
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In order to have a general model that applies to both situations, we assume that the minimal 
tip3 is equal to nt  ≥ 0. The customer can choose any tip, denoted by t, as long as nt t≥ . Situations 
where not everyone tips correspond to nt  = 0. In other situations, however, the norm of tipping 
might be so strong that everyone tips at least nt  > 0. The reason that everyone tips at least nt  > 0 
can be that the norm of tipping (at least nt ) in this situation is so strong that when a customer 
does not tip at least nt , he experiences a disutility (caused by disobeying the social norm)
 4 that is 
higher than the utility from the monetary gain (saving the tip amount). Consequently, utility 
maximization implies that the customer always tips at least nt . Because nt  is determined by the 
social norm about tipping in the relevant industry, and since it is cumbersome to use "the 
minimal amount that the social norm dictates one should tip," we henceforth refer to nt  simply as 
either "the tipping norm" or "the minimal tip."  
In addition, because the customer is a repeated customer, over time the service provider can 
remember the customer's tipping behavior in the past and respond to it in future encounters. In 
order to have a tractable model, we assume that the service provider adopts a simple rule, 
according to which the service quality he provides is an increasing function of the customer's 
reputation (denoted by R).5 Suppose further that the service quality provided increases with the 
                                                 
3 We assume for simplicity that the bill in each tipping occasion is the same, so it does not matter whether the 
minimum tip is a certain amount or a certain percentage of the bill. 
4 When a social norm to tip exists in a certain situation, people who disobey it feel embarrassed, guilty, and unfair 
(see Azar 2006, 2007b). 
5 Service quality being an increasing function of generosity in the past can result from several reasons. First, the 
service provider might simply reciprocate to past behavior of the customer (for a discussion of such behavior in 
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customer's reputation level at a decreasing rate. That is, S = S(R), where S'(R) > 0 and S''(R) < 0. 
The lowest possible reputation is normalized to be 0, and it yields the minimal service quality, 
(0)S S= ? .  
Research on tipping suggests that customers derive utility not only from obeying the norm, 
but also from tipping above the norm, because of psychological reasons such as willingness to 
feel generous, to show gratitude, and to help service providers who depend on tips as a major 
source of income. For example, Azar (2004b) shows that during the 20th century tips in 
restaurants and taxis went up, a phenomenon that suggests that people derive utility from tipping 
above the norm. Azar (2006) asked people in the U.S. and Israel why they tip in restaurants, 
letting them choose as many answers out of seven possible answers as they wished. While the 
reasons related to tipping being a social norm (tipping being the social norm, and feeling guilty 
or embarrassed when not tipping) were also common, two reasons that are not directly related to 
tipping being a social norm were also marked often. In the U.S., 67.8% of the respondents 
                                                                                                                                                             
restaurants, see Azar 2007b; for a literature review of reciprocity motivations in economic behavior, see Fehr and 
Gachter 2000). In addition, Brenner (2001) suggests that tipping a service provider in advance, even though it 
eliminates the economic motivation for good service (because the tip can no longer depend on service quality), often 
results in excellent service because the service provider feels obligated to reciprocate. Second, people who tip more 
generously also have the potential to change their tips more based on service quality (because they can give a higher 
punishment by tipping only tn, for example), so the service provider has higher incentives to satisfy them. In 
accordance with our assumption that service is increasing in reputation, Ginsberg (2001) mentions that waiters give 
better service when they expect the customer to be a generous one (even when they do not know him yet, but only 
base their conjecture on dress and other signals). Also supporting our assumptions is the study by Barkan and Israeli 
(2004) who find that waiters are good at predicting their tips and that they give better service to parties that are 
predicted to leave larger tips.   
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indicated that they tip because "By tipping I can show the waiter my gratitude for his service" 
and 66.9% indicated the reason "Waiters get low wages and depend on my tips to supplement 
their income" (in Israel the percentages were 68.9% and 32.4%, respectively). There is no 
apparent reason why someone who tips to show his gratitude or because the waiter depends on 
tips should derive utility from tipping only up to a certain level (the tipping norm) but not above 
it.  
We allow for such tipping motivations (to tip above the norm) by adding to the customer's 
utility the function ( )nt tψ − . We assume that the customer has additional psychological utility 
(i.e., utility that comes from psychological benefits, as opposed to utility derived from 
consumption) when he tips more, but that the marginal psychological utility is decreasing: 
( ) 0ψ ′ • >  and ( ) 0ψ ′′ • < . 
Finally, if we add to the above the monetary cost of the tip and assume that the customer's 
utility function is separable and additive in its various components and quasi-linear in money, the 
utility function at time 0 k T≤ ≤  may be written as   
.                          (1)[ ]{ } ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nU k S R k t k t t kφ ψ= + − −   
Suppose now that the tipping reputation is built up as a result of past tipping behavior. 
Because everyone tips at least nt , it is natural to assume that reputation increases as a function of 
the difference between the tip the customer chooses and nt . In addition, reputation is also eroded 
over time. Service providers forget some of the tipping behavior they observed in the past, for 
example. Moreover, if someone with positive reputation tips only nt  at a certain period, his 
reputation should fall rather than stay unchanged, and this is also captured when we introduce 
reputation deterioration. Denoting the instantaneous rate of reputation deterioration by δ (where 
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δ > 0) and using the standard notation in which a dot above a variable is the derivative of the 
variable with respect to time (k), the change in the customer’s reputation level at instant k is: 
                                    (2) .( ) ( ) ( )nR k t k t R kδ
• = − −                                                     
The value of δ may depend on various things, such as the frequency with which the customer 
purchases the service (patronage frequency in short). Waiters, for example, are likely to 
remember the tipping behavior of a customer who visits a restaurant every day better than the 
behavior of a customer who visits once a month; therefore, a lower value of δ captures a higher 
patronage frequency. In addition, δ  is related to the number of waiters in the restaurant or their 
turnover rate. In restaurants with relatively few waiters, or with waiters who retain their jobs for 
many years, a customer with a given patronage frequency encounters each waiter (on average) 
more frequently than he encounters each waiter in a restaurant with more waiters or higher 
waiter turnover (i.e., waiters who retain their jobs for shorter periods). Therefore, in the latter 
restaurant the customer's reputation erodes more quickly (because of the longer time between 
two encounters with the same waiter), corresponding to a higher value of δ. 
3. Evolution of Tipping and Reputation 
The customer’s problem is to choose a path of tipping over his planning horizon that 
maximizes the present value of his overall utility,  
,      (3)[ ]{ } ( )
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T
k k
nMax U k e dk Max S R k t k t t k e dk
ρ ρφ ψ− − = + − − ∫ ∫         
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where future utility is discounted at a constant exponential rate ρ, subject to the motion equation 
for reputation (2), the constraint on the level of tipping, ntkt ≥)( , and the starting level of 
reputation, R(0). Assuming that at time 0 the customer has no reputation at all, we set (0) 0R = . 
The customer’s problem may be viewed as an optimal-control problem which involves a 
state variable, R(k), and a control variable, t(k). The control variable (the tip given) influences the 
objective function (3) directly (through its own value) and indirectly through the impact on the 
evolution of the state variable (the customer's reputation). By choosing an optimal path of tipping 
over time, the customer also determines the path for his reputation and consequently also for 
service quality. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the current-value Hamiltonian 
corresponding to the customer’s problem is  
[ ]{ } ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )n nH S R k t k t t k k t k t R kφ ψ λ δ= + − − + − − ,           (4) 
where λ(k) is a co-state variable which indicates the shadow price of reputation in present-value 
utility units, the shadow price being the subjective value assigned by the customer to a reputation 
unit. For an interior solution ( nt t> ), the maximum principle conditions are:6  
 1 0 1tH ψ λ λ ψ′ ′= − + = → = −                               (5) 
( )RH Sλ ρ λ λ λ ρ δ φ
• • ′ ′= − → = + −                             (6) 
.nR t t Rδ
• = − −                                                                       (7) 
                                                 
6 Here and below we omit the time notation and the arguments of the functions when no confusion is expected for 
the sake of brevity. Subscripts after H stand for partial derivative of H (see equation (4)) with respect to the subscript 
variable.  
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Equation (5) is the first-order condition for optimal tipping, and it captures the idea that at the 
optimum (of an interior solution), the marginal cost of tipping another dollar (which is equal to 
one) is equal to the marginal benefit, that comes from two sources: the utility value of the 
increased reputation, which equals λ; and the marginal psychological utility, ψ '. Equation (5) 
implies that the optimal tip depends on the shadow price of reputation (λ) but is independent of 
the reputation level itself (R). Because utility is increasing in service quality which increases in 
reputation, λ must be positive. It thus follows that at the optimum ( ) 1tψ ′ < . A necessary 
condition for the tip to be higher than nt  is 0nt t tH = > , from which it follows that 
1 (0)λ ψ ′> − . It would be convenient to eliminate λ  from the analysis, so that the optimal 
solutions remain only in terms of the tip and reputation variables. Differentiating Equation (5) 
with respect to time yields:  
                                                         (8).tλ ψ• •′′= −                                                                 
Combining Equations (5), (6), and (8), we obtain: 
  .                                     (9) (1 ) ( ) St ψ φρ δψ ψ
• ′ ′ ′−= − + +′′ ′′                                                
The two differential equations (7) and (9), together with the first-order condition (5), 
determine the paths of optimal tipping and service quality over the customer’s planning horizon. 
Because the utility function is not specified, however, the differential equations cannot be solved 
explicitly. Nevertheless, a qualitative characterization of the optimal solution (i.e., determining 
whether tipping and the quality of service increase, decrease, or stay constant over time) might 
be possible by representing the differential equations in a state-control (R and t) space, known as 
a phase diagram. This diagram is presented in Figure 1. 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
To construct the diagram, notice that we can obtain from (9) and (7) the stationary loci for t 
(satisfying 0t
• = ) and R (satisfying 0R• = ), respectively: 
                                            (10)(1 ) ( ) 0Sψ ρ δ φ′ ′ ′− + − =                                       
(11)                                                            .0nt t Rδ− − =                                        
Equations (10) and (11) are plotted in Figure 1. Equation (11) implies that the 0R
• =  locus is 
a positively-sloped straight line, beginning at R = 0 and nt t= . The positive slope represents the 
idea that the higher is the customer's reputation, the more he has to tip in order to retain this 
reputation. This makes sense: a customer who has been very generous in the past cannot retain a 
reputation for being very generous if he switches to average tips, but a customer with a 
reputation for being an average tipper can retain this reputation by remaining average.  
Totally differentiating Equation (10) and rearranging, we also find that  
 .                             (12)( )
2
0
( )0
S St
R t
φ φ
ψ ρ δ•
′′ ′ ′′ ′+∂ = − <′′∂ +=
                                             
It is easy to see that the slope of the 0t
• =  locus is negative because we previously assumed 
that '( ) 0, ( ) , ( ) 0S φ ψ′ ′• > • > • >  and "( ) 0, ( ) 0, ( ) 0S φ ψ′′ ′′• < • < • < . Substituting R = 0 in 
(10) and rearranging yields 
,                                         (13)  ( ) (0)ˆ( ) 1n
S St t φψ ρ δ
′ ′′ − = − +
?
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where tˆ  represents the tipping level for R = 0 on the 0t
• =  locus. Similarly, substituting nt t=  in 
(10) yields 
,                                    (14)  
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
1 (0)
S R S Rφψ ρ δ
 ′ ′ ′− = +                                             
where Rˆ represents the reputation level for nt t=  on the 0t
• =  locus.  
To determine the directions of the streamlines in the phase diagram, we partially differentiate 
the motion equations (7) and (9), obtaining 
                                                                   (15)1 0R
t
•∂ = >∂                                                    
                                       (16) .( )
2
0
S St
R
φ φ
ψ
• ′′ ′ ′′ ′+∂ = >′′∂                                                    
Equation (15) indicates that in points above the 0R
• =  locus, R•  is positive (i.e., R increases 
over time), because the derivative of R
•
with respect to t  is positive. Consequently, the horizontal 
arrows in the region above the R
•
= 0 locus point to the right. Similarly, equation (15) also 
indicates that in points below the 0R
• =  locus, R•  is negative, implying that reputation decreases 
over time in that region. As a result, the horizontal arrows in the region below the R
•
= 0 locus 
point to the left. 
Because the derivative of t
•
 with respect to R is positive (see Equation (16)), in points to the 
right of the 0t
• =  locus, t•  is positive, so tips increase over time. Consequently, the vertical 
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arrows to the right of the 0t
• =  locus point upwards. Similarly, to the left of the 0t• =  locus, t•  is 
negative, so tips decrease over time, and therefore the vertical arrows in that region point 
downwards. 
The four streamlines (starting from points A, B, C and D) are drawn in accordance with these 
arrowheads and they imply that the stationary combination of R and t  (point E), in which R and t 
remain unchanged, is a saddle point: while there are paths converging to the stationary point, 
there are also paths leading away from it. Proposition 1 proves this more formally: 
Proposition 1. The stationary equilibrium that satisfies equations (10) and (11) simultaneously 
(Point E in Figure 1) is a saddle point. 
Proof. Notice that the Jacobian matrix of the system of equations describing the laws of motion, 
(7) and (9), evaluated at point E, is:  
    .                    (17)( )2
1R R
R tJ S S
t t
R t
δ
φ φ ρ δψ
• •
• •
 ∂ ∂ −     ∂ ∂= = ′′ ′ ′′ ′+   +  ∂ ∂ ′′  ∂ ∂ 
                        
The determinant of J is:  
,                                       (18) ( )
2
( ) 0
S S
J
φ φδ ρ δ ψ
′′ ′ ′′ ′+= − + − <′′   
the sign of which is negative. Hence the equilibrium solution is a saddle point.           Q.E.D. 
 
A key determinant of the evolution of tipping and reputation over time is their initial values. 
The initial value of reputation is exogenously given at R(0) = 0, implying that [ (0)]S R S= ? . The 
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initial value of the tip, t(0), should be derived by explicitly solving the differential equations (7) 
and (9), using R(0) = 0. This procedure, however, is impossible under the general formulation of 
the utility function. Consequently, restricting the analysis to qualitative characterization of the 
optimal solution, any value of (0) nt t≥  could match R(0) = 0 as a potential starting point for an 
optimal path of R and t over time.    
Figure 1 suggests four prototypes (denoted by the starting points A, B, C and D) of optimal 
trajectories of tipping and reputation over time. Because service quality is an increasing function 
of reputation, the direction of service quality is the same as that of the reputation. The directions 
of the horizontal and vertical arrows, as explained above, determine how the trajectories evolve. 
Along trajectory A, tipping starts decreasing while the level of reputation starts increasing 
with time, and eventually tipping and reputation converge to point E. Because point E is a 
stationary equilibrium, once it is reached, tipping and reputation remain unchanged. Along 
trajectory B, tipping starts decreasing while reputation increases, but after hitting the 0t
• =  locus, 
tipping changes direction and both tipping and reputation increase indefinitely over time. It is 
easy to see that tips and reputation also increase indefinitely in the case of t (0) > tˆ , depicted in 
trajectory D. Along trajectory C, tipping starts decreasing while the reputation level starts 
increasing with time, yet after hitting the 0R
• =  locus, the reputation level changes direction and 
both tipping and reputation decrease with time. Hence, the customer ends up with zero 
reputation, receives the worst service quality, and tips the minimal amount, nt .  
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4. Comparative Statics Results  
As discussed above, tips and reputation can converge to the point E, converge to (0, nt ), or 
diverge (in which case both tips and reputation increase indefinitely). Of particular interest is the 
interior stationary equilibrium of point E, because it seems to describe best the tipping behavior 
of most real customers, and because this is the only equilibrium which we can analyze 
meaningfully by means of comparative statics. How does point E change when the parameters of 
the model change? Consider first a change in the reputation deterioration rate, δ. Totally 
differentiating Equations (10) and (11) with respect to δ and solving the two resulting equations 
simultaneously we obtain:  
 (19)                                 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 EE R S St
S S
δ ψ φ φ
δ δ δ ρ ψ φ φ
 ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′− + +∂  =∂  ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′+ + + 
                
(20)   .                      ( ) ( )( ) ( )2
1
0EE
RR
S S
δ ρ ψ ψ
δ δ δ ρ ψ φ φ
′′ ′+ − −∂ = − <∂  ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′+ + + 
                                     
While ∂tE / ∂δ has an indeterminate sign, ∂RE / ∂δ is unambiguously negative. This implies 
that an increase in the deterioration rate will shift point E (through the changes in the 0t
• =  and 
0R
• =  loci) leftwards and either upwards or downwards relative to its present location in Figure 
1. That is, the equilibrium reputation level will fall, whereas the effect on equilibrium tipping 
cannot be determined unambiguously for the general case (i.e., without specifying more fully the 
utility function and the parameters of the model). Recall that a lower value of δ can represent a 
higher patronage frequency. Inequality (20) tells us that customers who purchase the service less 
often (and therefore have a higher value of δ) will have lower reputation. The reason is that their 
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tipping behavior is not remembered well due to their infrequent visits, and therefore they have 
less incentive to invest in building reputation in order to improve the service they receive.  
For a similar reason, we might expect to find that the tip is decreasing in δ, i.e., that frequent 
customers tip more. Because the expression in (19) cannot be signed, however, this is not 
necessarily true; for δ close enough to zero, for example, ∂tE / ∂δ is positive, implying that 
frequent customers tip less. The reason why ∂tE / ∂δ can be either positive or negative is that two 
opposite effects are taking place. The first effect is that a higher value of δ implies that it is less 
worthwhile to invest in building reputation, because reputation deteriorates more quickly when δ 
is higher. In other words, the returns to tipping in the form of future reputation and service 
quality are decreasing in δ, leading to less tipping when δ is higher. The second effect is that to 
reach and maintain a certain reputation level, more tipping is needed when δ is higher, because 
reputation deteriorates faster. The numerator of the expression in (19) determines which of the 
opposite effects dominates.  
Next, consider a change in the minimal tip, nt . Totally differentiating Equations (10) and 
(11) with respect to nt  and solving we obtain: 
)21(                                        
 
1E
n
t
t
∂ =∂  
)22(     .                  
 
0E
n
R
t
∂ =∂  
Equation (21) suggests that tipping in the stationary equilibrium changes by exactly the same 
amount as the change in the minimal tip. Because the reputation change in each period depends 
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on the difference between the tip and the minimal tip, it is intuitive to expect that equilibrium 
reputation is unaffected by the level of nt , as (22) reveals. 
Finally, consider a change in the customer’s discount rate, ρ. Totally differentiating 
Equations (10) and (11) with respect to ρ and solving we obtain:  
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It is easy to see that both (23) and (24) are negative, suggesting that when the customer 
becomes less patient (higher ρ), he tips less and has lower reputation in equilibrium. The 
intuition is simple: tipping creates a net cost today (since the psychological marginal utility from 
tipping is smaller than the cost of the tip), but a benefit in the future – better reputation and 
therefore higher service quality. The less patient the customer is, the less he wants to make 
sacrifices today for future benefits, therefore the less he tips and the smaller his reputation is.  
5. Empirical Evidence on Tipping Behavior 
An interesting issue is whether empirical evidence on tipping behavior supports the 
predictions of the model. Unfortunately, the existing empirical literature on tipping does not 
include data on reputation or time preferences of customers (the parameter ρ  in the model). It 
should be possible to obtain information about reputation by asking customers about their past 
tipping behavior in a certain restaurant, or by asking waiters to evaluate the customers' reputation. 
It is also feasible to get a proxy for time preferences of customers by asking them about their time 
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preferences or about how they divide their income between consumption and savings (and what 
types of savings they choose) and making inferences from these choices. Such empirical studies 
could be interesting and are provided as ideas for future research, but are beyond the scope of this 
article.  
What can be examined in empirical studies that appeared in the literature is the correlation 
between patronage frequency and tips. Recall that in the model this correlation could not be 
signed unambiguously, and its sign depended on the specific functions and parameters. It turns 
out that the empirical evidence is also somewhat unclear about the relationship between 
patronage frequency and tips. Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) studied six restaurants and a coffee 
shop and found in all of them that regular customers (those who patronized the restaurant at least 
once a month) tip more than non-regular patrons, but only in the coffee shop and one of the 
restaurants the difference was statistically significant. On average, regular patrons tipped 1.05 
percents more (of the bill size) than others. Conlin, Lynn, and O'Donoghue (2003) also find a 
positive relationship between patronage frequency and tips: the coefficient of the independent 
variable "Times tipper frequents this particular restaurant (monthly)" in a regression that explains 
percent tip is 0.187 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, this effect is small in 
magnitude: someone who dines at the restaurant five times each month tips less than 1% (of the 
bill) above the tip of a one-time customer. Lynn and Grassman (1990) and Lynn and McCall 
(2000b) also found significant and positive correlation between patronage frequency and tip size. 
However, as Azar (2006) argues, the positive correlation between patronage frequency and tip 
size might be the result of an omitted variable, namely the tipper's income. Higher-income 
customers generally eat at restaurants more often, and they might tip more because of their higher 
income. As a result, if the tipper's income is not controlled for in the regression (and the studies 
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mentioned above do not include income as an independent variable), a positive correlation 
between patronage frequency and tips might be only a result of the income effect on tips. 
This omitted variable problem can be overcome by hypothetical surveys, in which people are 
asked about how they would tip in a hypothetical scenario. If some people are asked to consider 
tipping in a restaurant they visit often while others are asked about a restaurant which they do not 
visit repeatedly, we can compare the responses in the two groups and the income problem is not 
present because the assignment of subjects to treatments is random (and therefore those who are 
asked to imagine a restaurant that they visit frequently are not richer than others). Studies that 
used this approach either found that the average tips in the two groups were the same (Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler 1986), or obtained mixed results about the correlation between patronage 
frequency and tips (Bodvarsson and Gibson 1999; Azar 2006).  
Another alternative to overcome the problem of the correlation between income and 
patronage frequency is to ask subjects about their income and include it in the analysis. Parrett 
(2006) did so and found in some regressions a positive relationship between patronage frequency 
and tips, and in other regressions a non-linear pattern in which customers with medium dining 
frequency tip more than customers with both low- and high patronage frequency. All these 
results, however, were not statistically significant, and moreover, the coefficients were also small 
in their magnitude – explaining less than one percent (of the bill size) in regressions of percent 
tip, and less than 30 cents in regressions of dollar tip. 
6. Conclusion 
We presented an optimal-control model of tipping in which tipping behavior creates 
reputation that affects service quality in the future; in particular, tipping more today improves 
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future service. Because of future service motivations, and because tipping provides psychological 
utility, the customer has an incentive to tip generously. On the other hand, tipping is also costly. 
We examined the optimal path of tipping, and found that tipping and reputation can evolve in 
four path prototypes: (A) Converging to an interior stationary equilibrium with tips above the 
minimal level and positive reputation; (B) Tipping decreases first and then increases indefinitely, 
while reputation increases indefinitely from the beginning; (C) Tipping converges to the minimal 
tip and reputation converges to zero; and (D) Tipping and reputation increase indefinitely from 
the beginning.  
We then analyzed the comparative statics of the interior stationary equilibrium. When the 
reputation erodes more quickly (which corresponds to lower patronage frequency), reputation in 
equilibrium is lower. Interestingly, however, tips are not necessarily lower. Increasing the 
minimal tip raises equilibrium tips by the exact same increase, and does not change equilibrium 
reputation. Finally, a more patient customer leaves higher tips and reaches a higher level of 
reputation in equilibrium. 
An interesting question is whether customers can overcome the need to build reputation by 
tipping upfront, before service is provided, in accordance with the suggestions made by Ruffle 
(1999) and Brenner (2001) that were discussed above (for a discussion of tipping in advance, see 
also Azar 2007b). Indeed, in the early history of tipping, tips were often given before service was 
provided (Azar 2004c). While upfront tipping does exist in certain occupations, waiters and taxi 
drivers (and many other service providers) are not tipped in advance. Why do restaurant 
customers and taxi passengers not tip in advance?  
There seem to be several main reasons for this. First, when there is a strong social norm of 
tipping after the service is provided, such as in restaurants and taxis, people would probably feel 
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uncomfortable and embarrassed if they tipped before the service was provided. Second, the social 
norm in restaurants and taxis is to tip a certain percentage of the bill (in the U.S. it is about 15%-
20%, see Post 1997). The customer therefore needs to know the bill amount before choosing the 
tip, and the bill is unknown before the service has been provided. Finally, tipping in advance 
undermines the major roles of tipping. Many customers tip because they want to show their 
gratitude for the service they received (Azar 2006) – but how can someone feel grateful for a 
service he did not receive yet and does not know whether it would be good or bad? In addition, 
one of the main justifications for having a social norm of tipping is that it allows the customer to 
monitor the worker and to give him incentives to provide good service.7 But if tips are given in 
advance, they no longer depend on the quality of service, and therefore they cannot fulfill these 
monitoring and incentives roles.   
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Figure 1: Evolution of Tipping and Reputation 
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